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THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE ETHICAL REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS
James M. McCauley
On September 11, 2001, al Quaida terrorists employed com-
mercial jet airliners to launch massive attacks on the United States,
successfully destroying the World Trade Center in New York City and
inflicting substantial damage to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. A
third unsuccessful attack, believed to have been intended for Washing-
ton D.C., was stymied by the heroic efforts of the passengers of another
jet airliner when it crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, south-
east of Pittsburgh. In total, over 3,000 people were killed on American
soil on that single day.
In reaction to this atrocity, on September 18, 2001, Congress
authorized President Bush, by Joint Resolution, "to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
attacks" or "harbored such organizations or persons." The President
responded by committing armed forces to Afghanistan to subdue al
Quiada and remove the governing Taliban regime supporting it. Dur-
ing these ongoing military operations, thousands of alleged enemy
combatants have been captured and detained by U.S and allied forces.
Swift and sweeping changes in the law occurred, including pas-
sage of the USA Patriot Act,1 permitting the federal government to
have access to information about American citizens once protected as
private, including: financial transactions, educational records, tele-
phone conversations and grand jury findings. Previously protected in-
1 -United and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" (]USA Patriot Act), Pub. Law No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001,. The Act includes provisions designed to de-
tect, block and freeze funds and assets used to promote international terrorism
efforts and advance the United States government's war on terrorism. Title HI of
the Act makes significant amendments to the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001, the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970. Some of these
changes affect all financial institutions in the United States, broadly defined to
include banks, brokers and dealers of securities, insurance companies, investment
companies and firms, persons involved in real estate settlements and closings, cur-
rency exchangers and money transmitters and many other industry sectors not
recognized as "traditional" financial institutions. Three key sections of the Act
directed at financial institutions amend existing anti-money laundering laws:
Sections 314. 326 and 352.
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formation can now be requested of a "financial institution" by the
government without judicial order or intervention. The Act, as well as
Executive Orders issued shortly after 9/112 allow the government to
block assets of known or suspected terrorists, make it unlawful for citi-
zens to deal with suspected or known terrorists, and require "financial
institutions"-broadly defined to include attorneys in particular cir-
cumstances-to run through lists published by the government and
make suspicion transaction reports to the government if their clients
are found on the list. Moreover, these regulations, issued by the Trea-
sury Department and OFAC, make it unlawful for a "financial institu-
tion" to "tip off' customers or clients that a STR has been made. Civil
and criminal sanctions have been imposed on legitimate businesses for
failing to implement proper anti-money laundering procedures to de-
tect and identify suspected and known terrorists who seek to funnel
funds to support further terrorist activity through legal economic
markets.
The Act and the complementary Bureau of Prisons Rule, appli-
cable to all persons imprisoned in the federal penitentiary system and
jails convicted or detained on charges with offenses against the United
States, authorize the monitoring of communications between inmates
and their attorneys whenever federal authorities have "reasonable
suspicion" to believe that a particular inmate may use attorney-client
communications to facilitate acts of terrorism.3 Generally, under the
regulations, the inmate must be given prior notice of the government's
intent to monitor communications with his or her attorney. The regu-
lations also create a sort of "firewall" by requiring that a "privilege
team" of government agents, independent from the agents involved in
the investigation or prosecution of the inmate, monitor the communi-
cations. The privilege team cannot disclose any intercepted informa-
tion without court approval, however, court approval is not required
for the interception as it would be, for example, for the government to
engage in surreptitious wiretapping or interception of electronic
communications.
2 On September 23, 2001, the President, by Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, di-
rected the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury and other federal
agencies to "den[y] financing and financial services to terrorists and terrorist orga-
nizations." 66 F.R. 49079, 49081 (Sept. 23, 2001). E.O. 13224 blocks all property
and interests in property of the terrorist-related individuals and entities desig-
nated under the order. The primary purpose of these initiatives is to identify,
block or freeze financial transactions of known or suspected terrorist-related indi-
viduals or organizations. Any transaction or dealing with the designated individu-
als or organizations or with the blocked property or assets is prohibited.
3 Monitoring of Communications With Attorneys To Deter Acts of Terrorism, 28
CFR Parts 500 and 501, [BOP-1116; AG Order No. 2529-2001], RIN 11200-ABO8,
issued by the United States Department of Justice on October 30, 2001.
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I was asked to speak today about the government's war on ter-
rorism and its effect on the rule of law and lawyer's relationships with
their clients. I begin with some fundamental ethical principles with
which I am sure many of you are familiar. As lawyers, we took an oath
to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law. We also have an ethi-
cal duty to improve access to justice and improve the legal system. As
lawyers we must represent our clients with undivided loyalty, and pre-
serve their confidences and secrets by not revealing information to
others that would be detrimental or embarrassing to our clients.4 Pub-
hc prosecutors have a duty to see that justice is done, and not merely
seek convictions.5 In recent times, it appears the government has
taken actions which give good cause to examine these principles
against the backdrop of the government's concerted effort to protect
our people from future attacks like the one witnessed on 9/11.
One area of very serious concern is the Government's monitor-
ing of attorney-chent communications, invoked in the name of fighting
terrorism. Lawyers owe a duty of loyalty to their clients, especially
clients charged with criminal offenses. A fundamental duty under the
rules of professional conduct is the lawyer's obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of information obtained during the attorney-client rela-
4 See, Va. S. Ct. R., pt. 6, Sec. II, Rule 1.6.
ABA Prosecution Standard 3-1.2 (c); ABA Model Code of Prof. Resp. EC-13; Vir-
ginia Code of Prof. Resp. EC 8-10; Macon v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 363, 46 S.E.
2d 396 (1948) ("It is just as much the duty of the attorney for the Commonwealth
to protect his fellow citizens from unjustified prosecutions as it is to prosecute
those who are guilty.".
Comment [11, Virginia Rule 3.8:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of suf-
ficient evidence. (emphasis added).
See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obli-
gation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape nor innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor-indeed he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.
20041
40 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 4:1
tionship. When lawyers represent clients and the government-or any
other adversary-seeks to obtain access to communications or infor-
mation that are privileged under the attorney-client privilege, or pro-
tected under the ethical duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, the
lawyer must take affirmative steps to resist such action and preserve
confidentiality.6
Criminal lawyers have often faced the problem that communi-
cations with their clients in custody have been subject to official moni-
toring, whether during a visit to the jail, or over the telephone. In
general, when an attorney has a reasonable suspicion that his or her
communications with a client in custody are being monitored by gov-
ernment officials, the attorney must take affirmative action to safe-
guard confidentiality.7 Specifically, the attorney must make inquiry of
the nature and extent of the government's monitoring and obtain as-
surances that officials will cease and desist. If such assurances cannot
be obtained, the attorney should seek appropriate relief in court.
The ABA, ACLU, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, the American Bar Foundation, and prominent law school
professors and public interest groups have filed amicus briefs criticiz-
ing the detention of U.S. citizens classified by the U.S. Government as"enemy combatants." For example, in the habeas corpus proceedings
filed on behalf of Yasser Hamdi? and Jose Padillo,9 the government
takes the position that U.S. citizens, once classified as "enemy combat-
ants," can be detained and held incommunicado, thus denied access to
counsel. Both cases are pending before the United States Supreme
Court, the Fourth Circuit having ruled that such unqualified detention
6 Va. Legal Ethics Op. 334 (1979) (A lawyer may produce privileged information to
a grand jury if the lawyer challenges the subpoena and loses. If the lawyer believes
that the materials are not privileged, the lawyer may reveal the information with-
out challenging the subpoena); Va. Legal Ethics Op. 967 (1987) (A law firm may
produce a former client's documents after unsuccessfully opposing production and
being ordered by the court to produce the documents); Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1300
(1989) (A lawyer may not reveal client confidences unless disclosure is compelled
by a court after the lawyer challenges the subpoena in court).
7 National Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers Ethics Adv. Op. 02-01 (November 2002);
See also Ariz. Bar Ethics Op. 87-19 (1987)(public defender, upon learning that his
communications with a juvenile client in a detention center were being monitored
must seek relief in court and obtain assurances that government officials will
cease and desist monitoring attorney-client communications).
8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); rehearing denied 337 F.3d 335
(4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 981 ( Jan. 9, 2004).
9 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (S.D. N.Y. 2002), remanded 352 F.3d 695 (2d
Cir. 2003), cert granted 72 USLW 3488 (Feb. 20, 2004)
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was lawful, the Second Circuit concluding otherwise.'" These persons,
according to the government, may be held, without charges, until the
hostilities have ceased. Given the nature of the Government's War on
Terrorism, the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and decla-
rations from President Bush 1 and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, no
one has any confidence that the war on terrorism will be over in the
foreseeable future.
The ABA's efforts have focused thus far on obtaining due pro-
cess rights for defendants being tried by military commissions or tribu-
nals, who are being denied the right to counsel and the right to
confront witnesses; the right of alien deportees to public hearings and
access to counsel; and government monitoring of attorney-client com-
munications in terrorism cases. The ABA has pursued these objectives
thorough the filing of amicus briefs in pertinent cases and through lob-
bying Congress to enact legislation that would implement meaningful
judicial review of "enemy combatant" detentions, the adoption of clear
standards or criteria for the classification, the right to counsel and the
means to challenge or rebut the government's allegation that an indi-
vidual is an "enemy combatant."
In the case of Yasser Hamdi, recently decided by the Fourth
Circuit, the court ruled that a U.S. citizen captured by U.S. or allied
forces during an ongoing military combat operation in Afghanistan
was not entitled to challenge his detention on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Hamdi did not dispute the government's factual asser-
tion that he was captured in a zone of combat operations abroad.
Thus, further judicial inquiry is unnecessary given the undisputed
facts of his capture. Stated differently, because Hamdi did not contest
the government's factual assertions that he was captured in a combat
zone during military hostilities abroad and was found among the en-
emy forces; that coupled with the fact that Hamdi was classified as an
enemy combatant, his petition failed as a matter of law. The Fourth
Circuit opinion does not address what rights Hamdi would have to
challenge the government's factual assertions had he denied them.
The Court took specific pains to point out that its holding was limited
to the facts before it-the undisputed capture of a U.S. citizen in a
"o Padilla v. Bush, n. 7, supra, 352 F.3d at 712 (detention unlawful absent explicit
Congressional authorization).
"' President George W. Bush, Jr, in his Address to the Joint Session of Congress
and the Nation on September 20, 2001 stated:
Americans are asking- how will we fight and win this war? We
will direct every resource at our command-every means of di-
plomacy, every means of intelligence, every instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary
weapon of war-to the disruption and defeat of the global terror
network.
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foreign country during military combat with a hostile enemy and a de-
termination by the executive branch of government that he was allied
with the enemy forces.
The Fourth Circuit explicitly recognized the difference between
Hamdi's case, and the case of Jose Padilla, now pending on appeal in
the Second Circuit. Unlike Hamdi, Padilla was in Chicago when he
was taken into custody on a material witness warrant issued by a fed-
eral grand jury in New York. The government had evidence that Pa-
dilla had been abroad in Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan, meeting
with high ranking al Quaida officials and purportedly returned to the
United States to plan terrorists attacks, including a plan to detonate a
radioactive or "dirty bomb" somewhere in this country. Shortly after
he was taken into custody, President Bush signed an order designat-
ing him as an "enemy combatant" and he was released to military au-
thorities and has been detained in a military brig ever since. The
government has kept Padilla in isolation and he has no access to any-
one, including counsel. There were no criminal charges pending
against Padilla. Padilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
New York challenging his detention. One of the issues before the dis-
trict court was Padilla's right to consult with counsel to prepare and
prosecute his habeas petition. The district court ordered the govern-
ment to work out with Padilla's counsel the terms and conditions
under which Padilla would be allowed to consult with counsel. The
government not only failed to do so, but argued that Padilla's access to
counsel would undermine the progress his interrogators had made
over the course of Padilla's detention, and that giving Padilla access to
counsel would pose a grave security risk. The court denied the govern-
ment's motion to reconsider in March 2003 and the government has
appealed this decision to the Second Circuit. Clearly, Padilla cannot
have meaningful access to the courts if he cannot consult with a law-
yer. While the government is not required under the Sixth Amend-
ment to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, since a habeas
proceeding is civil not criminal, the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause accords citizens the opportunity to be heard, present evidence
on their behalf and to challenge or rebut the government's assertions.
A citizen cannot be denied the right to consult with a lawyer in order
to exercise those due process rights. The government's evidence in this
case consists of a Presidential Order, an affidavit setting out factual
assertions that support the classification of Padilla as an "enemy com-
batant" and a declaration from an official that allowing Padilla access
to counsel will undermine the interrogation techniques and strategy
which the government has employed during Padilla's detention. The
declaration used by the government is not based on first hand informa-
tion and admits that some of the information is not reliable. The dec-
laration does not allege what specific actions Padilla took nor does it
allege specific involvement in planning any attack. Although Attorney
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General Ashcroft told the media that Padilla's arrest thwarted a plot
by al Quada terrorists to detonate a dirty bomb, the Deputy Secretary
of State was quoted as saying there actually was no real plan per se,
only some loose talk. Some of the government's more detailed factual
assertions are under seal and cannot be challenged by Padilla or his
counsel. The government's position in this case is remarkable: Padilla
should not be allowed to present evidence or challenge the govern-
ment's assertion that he is an "enemy combatant" once the govern-
ment has produced "some evidence" supporting the classification. If
the government's position is upheld by the Second Circuit, Padilla's
petition offers no meaningful access to justice.
But the government's position in the case is so clearly wrong
for additional reasons. The government's case is purportedly based on
well settled principles established in the law of war, specifically that
an enemy combatant captured on the battlefield can be detained by his
capturer until the end of the hostilities. A prisoner of war or enemy
combatant has no right to counsel or to legally challenge his detention
unless charged with a war crime. The detention of enemy combatants
is not punishment or retribution, but is simply justified to prevent the
prisoner from reuniting with the enemy during the hostility. These
rules are quite logical when applied properly. Clearly, courts and law-
yers should not be involved in challenging or second guessing the cap-
ture of enemy combatants during hostilities with another country. But
those are not the facts in Padilla's case.
Experts on the laws of war and international law have filed an
amicus brief challenging the government's expansive use of the term"enemy combatant." According the experts, the term "enemy combat-
ant" is a clearly defined term under international humanitarian law
and the rules of war. To be an enemy combatant under international
law or convention, one must generally be directly involved in armed
combat on behalf of a nation state. While Padilla was allegedly associ-
ated with al Quaida, al Quaida-as well as any other international
terrorist group, is not a nation state or foreign country. The U.S. can
or may declare war on al Quaida or terrorism, but that does not estab-
lish the necessary predicate, under international law, for treating ter-
rorists as enemy combatants. Padilla was not captured during any
active military operation abroad, nor was he armed at the time he was
taken into custody. Neither case law nor historical precedent supports
the government's classification of Padilla as an "enemy combatant."
Civilians who aid and abet enemy forces may be tried and punished for
treason or other crimes against the state, as has been the case during
the civil war and World War II. Under those circumstances, however,
they have a right to counsel, to prepare a defense, present evidence
and require that the government prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the government's position is correct, by logical extension, the
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government could declare war on drugs or organized crime and detain
indefinitely drug dealers and other criminals, keeping then incommu-
nicado without charging them.
In a related matter, Zacharias Moussauoi, detained since 2001
on charges of conspiracy and involvement in al Quiada hijackings and
future terrorist attacks, cannot, over the government's opposition on
national security grounds, depose and examine two witnesses, also de-
tainees, to elicit testimony that would show that he was not directly
involved in the planning of the 9/11 attack or that his involvement was
minor. The federal district court has made a ruling that Moussauoi
has made an adequate showing that such testimony would be relevant
to his defense and possibly preclude the Government seeking the
death penalty. However, the government refuses to comply with the
court's orders allowing the depositions. As a sanction for the govern-
ment's non-compliance, the court has ordered that the government is
barred from seeking the death penalty in Moussauoi's case. The
court's order has been appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
These post 9/11 laws and regulations represent significant de-
partures from prior law. At issue is the extent to which the Govern-
ment, in furtherance of its critical and important duty to protect our
citizens from atrocious terrorist acts may nonetheless, in the interests
of national security, deprive citizens, detainees and defendants
charged with terrorist crimes of meaningful access to counsel, wit-
nesses, and due process. On September 16, 2002, a special appeals
court created under the Foreign Surveillance Act of 1978 met secretly
to hear the Justice Department argue that it should be given even
more latitude to obtain information on suspected terrorists. During
this hearing only attorneys from the Department of Justice were
heard-no one else was allowed to be present to challenge the Attor-
ney General, not even members of the Senate Judiciary and Intelli-
gence Committees who asked to attend.
History has revealed that during times of national crisis and
war, civil liberties have taken second chair to national security: the
suspension of habeas proceedings during the Civil War, the intern-
ment of Japanese, German, and Italian Americans during WWII, and
the domestic surveillance and harassment of peace demonstrators and
civil rights leaders such as the late Dr. Martin Luther King. If the
government is allowed to permanently destroy the attorney-client rela-
tionship and the rule of law, and to deny citizens due process and ac-
cess to counsel, all in the interest of fighting terrorism and national
security, then the terrorists have won and we have lost. As Senator
Russell Feingold stated: "Preserving our freedom is the reason we are
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engaged in this new war on terrorism. We will have lost that warwithout firing a shot if we sacrifice the liberties of the American
people."1 2
12 Senator Russell Feingold, On Opposing the U.S.A. Patriot Act, ARr-HiPELAGO,
Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 2002).
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